2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

# PREFACE

ABOUT the middle of the XIXth century the shadow of Russia in Central Asia began to fall across the vision of a Britain which had just succeeded to the Sikhs in the Panjab and was occupied in the consolidation of territories which became known as the North-West Frontier. From that date the external policy of the British government in India was directed mainly to the stabilization of Middle Eastern frontiers and to safeguarding the continued existence of Persia and Afghanistan against the forces of Russian expansion. As a result of that policy the Russian advance was halted, where it still stands, on the Oxus and along the fringe of the Turkmen mountains.

In due course the Soviets succeeded the Tsars in the Turkish lands of Central Asia, and Britain withdrew her forces from a partitioned Indian continent. In Southern and South-Western Asia the bonds of the Commonwealth are now loosened. In Central Asia Soviet Russia remains in control of many million Muslims of Turco-Iranian stock. These territories, once known as Turkistan, are in fact an overlap between the Islamic and the Soviet world. It is the purpose of this book at a moment of solvency brought on by Stalin's death to weigh old influences with new, and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist world and the West.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least fifty years. It is extremely hard today to uncover modern sources of real value in a field of peculiar importance and little known outside Soviet Russia. The gap has to be filled mainly from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period in particular — the uneasy interregnum between the October Revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power — I have

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL



drawn, among others, on the writings of Professor Togan of Istanbul University, himself a chief actor in the field and the author of a notable book in Turkish entitled *Bugünkü Türkili* (Turkistan today). Page references to this book would not help the English reader and I have therefore been compelled, with the author's ready permission, to include a number of translated passages. I am also greatly in the debt of Mr. W. E. D. Allen, who has given ungrudgingly of the great store of his own knowledge in this field of orientalia, and of Dr. Stefan Wurm of Vienna University, whose knowledge of Turkic linguistics is unrivalled in any country. The linguistic map is his work. No Turcologist myself, I can plead that a lifetime spent among the neighbouring Muslim peoples of the Afghan borderland provides some of the conditions in which insight can do something to fill the gaps in knowledge. Russia in Transoxiana was never far from the thought of those who looked outward towards the Oxus from Peshawar. To English readers the Oxus is so much more familiar than the Amu Darya that I have been tempted to use the names indiscriminately, as the context suggests.

The accepted linguistic and ethnic classifications of the Turks are somewhat more complex than those adopted in this book, which does not aim at the precise resolution of such problems. The connotation of *Turkey* is clear enough; where distinction is necessary, I have included the Turks of Turkey in the definition *Western Turks*, which also covers the *Azeris* of Azerbaijan and (linguistically though not geographically) the *Turkmens*. On the Volga, in the Urals and in part of the Crimea (before the deportations) the term *Tatar*, or *Turco-Tatar*, has the sanction of usage. In those parts of Central Asia formerly known as *Turkistan* — the real hub of this book — I have avoided the doubtful appellation *Turkistani*, replacing it by *Eastern* or *Central Asian Turk*, and confining the word *Turki* to those Eastern Turks who live in Sinkiang under Chinese dominion. Where more precision is needed in references to the Turks of Russian Central Asia, I have particularized them as *Uzbeks*, *Kazaks*, and so on. Except in

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL.7



a few cases, clear from the context, my choice between *Turkish* and *Turkic* is determined by a convention whereby scholars seek to allot the one to peoples and the other to languages. 101 128

The transliteration of names in a Turkic tongue is not to be simply resolved by reference to the canons of Arabists or the Hunterian system. An explanation of the method adopted in the text will be found in an appendix. 1

In quoting from the great Russian historian Barthold I have used a French translation, which he authorized. It will be stronger thus, without further distillation. If what follows fails to give the picture, it is because (as Barthold truly wrote) —

> L'histoire turque exige des connaissances qui ne se trouvent que rarement réunies chez une seule personne. Il ne suffit donc point d'être turcologue pour écrire l'histoire des peuples turcs. Suivant l'époque qu'on étudie, il faut être également ou bien sinologue, ou bien arabisant, ou bien iranisant.

For the Western writer even that is not enough, for he should be able to go through the Russian medium also. In this region many studies meet and cross.

O. C.

*March* 1953

The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Edgar Newgass for help in the compilation of the index.

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 269-272 -- Analyst]

[p. viii is blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

# I

# INTRODUCTORY

ALMOST in the centre of Asia, and far removed from the oceans, are two great natural basins of continental land, known until quite recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkistan. Much of the perimeter of both these territories is ringed round by some of the highest mountains in the world, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by peoples in whom a Turkish strain (though overlaying and overlaid by others) may still be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them as the Eastern or Central Asian Turks.

The two parts of this Turkistan are divided from one another by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring all the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-parting, linking the Tienshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkistan and the Chinese Turki dominion now known as Sinkiang.

Of Sinkiang much is known and much has been written. In earlier centuries there was a parallel movement in the history of the Central Asian Turks in the oasis civilizations both west and east of the Pamirs. Certain dynasties held sway on both sides of the mountains, while, farther north, the Ili gap supplied a route for migration, conquest and trade. More recently Sinkiang opened its gates more widely to the West. For the half-century before 1947 the government in India maintained a consulate in Kashghar on behalf of the British government, and until the other day there were British

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



that figure greatly outstrips such important countries as Canada or Australia. It is, moreover, an organized population in tightly packed groups, gathered either on patches of intensive cultivation to which water can be brought, or in urban centres where the new industry flourishes. Yet it is strange to compare the extent of modern Western knowledge of these peoples with that which has been gathered about Afghanistan or Persia, to both of which Turkistan is immediately adjacent. With Pakistan or India the comparison is more startling still.

The isolation of the great Turanian basin between the Caspian and the Tienshan becomes all the more remarkable when it is realized that these lands were once the springboard of the Turkish race, and were also the seat of a renowned Muslim civilization which in its time rivalled the civilizations of Baghdad, Damascus and Cordova. From the date of the Arab conquest late in the VIIth century Maveraunnahr, or Transoxiana, became a part of the Muslim East. Today it never figures in the many definitions of that region, but it is time to claim it as the marginal overlap, both geographical and cultural, between the continental system of Russia and a Turco-Iranian system of South-Western Asia, in which at one time it played an important part.

In regions of overlap there will be stresses; Poland, Alsace, the North-West Frontier come to mind. Those stresses will be greater if, as in this case, the peoples inhabiting the region of overlap are alien to the Power to which they are for the time being subject and akin to their neighbours on the other side. In this instance too the overlap is adjacent to a frontier south of which lie the vast populations of the Indian sub-continent and the resources of the Middle East. Remembering this, it is not difficult to understand how Russia has come to determine on a policy of steady assimilation. Under the Russians, more particularly when the Soviets succeeded to the Tsars, the people of Turkistan have for this reason

mingling of nationalities as between the five republics, the figures are near enough. The difference between the two sets of population figures is due mainly to Russian immigration, which in Kazakistan accounts for approximately half the total population.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL?

# II

# THE TURANIAN BASIN

*Something too of marvel, if not much of beauty, must there be in a country which presents to the eye a succession of bewildering contrasts; where the scarp of precipitous mountains frowns over an unending plain; where spots of verdure lie strewn like islets amid shoreless seas of sand; where mighty rivers perish in marsh and swamp; where populous cities are succeeded as a site of residence by tents of felt, and sedentary toil as a mode of life by the vagrant freedom of the desert.*

CURZON

THERE is no State or Republic of Turkistan on modern maps of the world. Even on maps of the Victorian era Turkistan was divided into its Russian, Chinese and Afghan components, and of the Russian territories a large part east of the Caspian Sea was then known as Transcaspia. The Chinese name of Sinkiang — the New Dominion — came to be applied even in European parlance to the Tarim basin and Jungaria. In Russia, the name of Turkistan during the Basmachi rebellion of the early Soviet days had become a watchword of a larger Turkish nationalism and, with the Kremlin's establishment of what are ostensibly tribal Republics in Central Asia, Russian Turkistan as the name of a region finally disappeared from the atlases. In the USSR the name is now confined to the town near the Sir Darya (Jaxartes) in ancient times known as Yese or Yassi, the home of the celebrated saint Ahmed Yesevi, who lived there in the XIIth century. Thus there remains no territory of Turkistan on the map of today except the relatively small Afghan districts sandwiched between the Amu Darya (Oxus) and the mountains of the Hindu Kush. It is to take the place of the outmoded term that local pride has suggested a

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



101 substitute, Türkili, the Turkish homeland.

In a sense this new habit is a return to the geographical thought which obtained in the early XVIth century, when Babur left his home in the vale of Farghana to become by conquest the ruler of Kabul and later the first Mughul Emperor of Hindustan. In the whole of his Memoirs Babur speaks [1] of Turkistan only three times and that in the connotation of the town of Yese. To him the territories now collectively known as Russian Central Asia were centred on Maveraunnehr, an Arabic term meaning the land beyond the river. This is the *duab* or mesopotamia bounded by the rivers called by the Greeks Oxus and Jaxartes, known to Arab geographers as the Jaihun and Saihun, and to Persians as the Amu and the Sir Darya. European writers conveniently translate Maveraunnahr as Transoxiana.[2]

The lands south of the Amu Darya up to the Hindu Kush Babur knew as Balkh or (farther east) as Badakhshan, while those north of the Sir Darya were roughly divided into Chach or Shash (the country round Tashkent) and Mughulistan (the Ili valley and Jungaria). Northern Persia and the western Afghan plateau then, as now, were known as Khorasan, the eastern Afghan country was called after its chief towns Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. The upper valley of the Sir Darya (known to Babur as the Saihun) then, as now, was called Farghana, while the lower stretches of both the great rivers, then possibly connected in one network of waterways, made up the famous delta country of Khorezm, with its capital at Urgench. These old names are woven into the history and aptitudes of the land and its peoples; without them there can be no understanding of the reactions which followed the Tsarist conquest or of the later development under the pressures of the Soviet system.

133 Just as Tigris and Euphrates give life and meaning to the riverain basin of Irak, so do the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya to the much greater Turanian basin. There are other

[1] Bib. I, 12 and 61.

[2] Scholars seem unable to decide between Transoxiana and Transoxania. Barthold and G. Kirk use the former, Arnold Toynbee and M. Czaplicka the latter, Schuyler and Mrs. Beveridge both!

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative appellation of 'Sart'.

At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well to look always for the essential difference between the settled cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers. One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

1 [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be known in India as the Mughul dynasty! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one another; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



the steppe between the sedentary kingdoms of Maveraunnahr and the Mongols of the east. It was into this reservoir that the Mongol river poured, only to raise its level and cause it to overflow. The range of the reservoir was roughly coincident with the present Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. When the seasons pressed and nomadic life became hard, the tribes would prey on the sedentary population. Conversely, their numbers were often increased by the accession of groups who had rebelled against the authority of the dynasties in the oases, preferring a rover's life to submission, and it was to such groups that the name Kazak [1] came later to be applied. The steppe offers freedom to the venturesome, and many elements at different times were fused in these wandering populations. Ethnically, the farther removed from the towns with their underlying Persian stock, the closer to the traditional Tatar, thick-bodied, small-eyed and with scanty hair. The Kipchak language was of the Turkic family. Many of Chingiz' soldiers were undoubtedly of this Turkish stock, and the Mongol way of life was slowly absorbed in that of the Turks, who were in a position to draw on the mixed Irano-Turkish culture of the sedentary populations.

It was these vagrants who would gather in loose confederations sometimes to plunder the resources of Maveraunnahr itself, sometimes in alliance with newcomers to sweep beyond Central Asia into farther fields.

As these processes worked themselves out, the various stocks crossed and mingled, joined and separated like the raindrops on the window. But, just as even today the nomad Turkish and Mongol cross can be seen in the typical Kazak, it is still possible to pick out in the sedentary population of the oases of Transoxiana a type which is in all respects, physical, mental and moral, at odds with the Kazak or the Turkmen of the steppe. The man of the oasis is often small-

[1] *Kazak* is an old Turkish word meaning a vagabond, and later a partisan or guerrilla. It means an outlaw who refuses to live a settled life, or who has fled from tyranny. Some have traced its derivation from *Kazmak*, to dig (but digging is just what Kazaks do not do), others from *Kaz*, a goose. Either derivation seems far-fetched. The word Cossack was taken from it and applied to the Russian who lived a similar life.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Tadjik



The man of the oasis is often small-

boned, loose-limbed, hirsute, with long narrow head and nose, [142]
the man of the steppe stocky, round of head, with scanty 369
beard. The one is a careful cultivator and good craftsman;
the other has been bred with flocks and is tied to no plot of
land. The one is often a fanatic; the other sits, or rides, 101
easily to dogma. The men of the oasis were once commonly
called *Sarts* by the men of the steppe, and as the currency of
the Turkic language ousted the Persian, this name later made
no distinction between the townsman or cultivator who spoke
as a Turk and him who spoke Persian.[1] Still later the appella-
tion Sart came to be used in a pejorative sense, and there has
been a tendency to shun it. The picture is familiar to all
who know the towns of the Pathan province of Pakistan,
the old North-West Frontier. There too the town popula-
tions, though many of them speak Pashtu, do not belong to
the dominant stock of the Pathans but are remnants of the
*indigènes* or the camp followers of the conquests that passed
that way; the Pathan tribesmen know them familiarly as
'townees'. Barthold[2] claims a similar origin for the word
*Sart*, saying it was borrowed from India and used by the
Turks in the sense of 'merchant', with a pejorative innuendo
like that to be found in the Indian word *banya* of today. A
latter-day pride has led the Turkic-speaking Sarts to arrogate
to themselves the name of Uzbek, making language the
criterion to distinguish between Turk and Tajik.

The Tajiks who still speak Persian live either in the towns
or on the oases that are under the most intensive cultivation
(as around Khojent in Farghana), or in the remote Pamir
valleys now known as Gorno (Hill)-Badakhshan, where the
Turks have never penetrated. Many of the Tajiks of the
mountains, like their neighbours in Gilgit and Chitral, belong
to the Ismaili[3] sect of Shiism, which venerates the Agha

[1] Cf. Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 190.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 34. Another derivation is to connect 'Sart' etymologically with the Persian *Shahr*, a city. See Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 104.

[3] Ismailis form a great part of the population in Afghan Wakhan and in Gilgit and Chitral. Chitral is in Pakistan: Gilgit is included in that part of Kashmir at present in Pakistan occupation.

2: Canoe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Tadiks
Kent Turks



Khan, and Soviet publicists, of design or in ignorance, have sought for this reason to affirm that they are not Muslims. There is also a tendency to play up their Persian speech as a counter to Turkish nationalism, and we find all the great Persian poets, even Saadi and Hafiz of far-away Shiraz, figuring in Soviet history as honorary Tajiks. As fighters the Turkish stocks hold the Tajiks in derision, and the annals of the Basmachi period have an amusing description [1] of a Tajik detachment which turned out in support of Enver Pasha:

> They were followers of the Sheikhs and Mullahs, well-fed and fat and quite useless for fighting. They wore large wooden clogs with soles two inches thick, had carpets on their saddles, and tea-kettles hanging from them. When they started to run in battle, all this naturally fell off.

Here is the inspiration for the White Knight of Lewis Carroll.

Most of the townsmen and many of the settled cultivators south of the Tienshan speak both a Turkic tongue and the Tajik form of Persian. Togan [2] calls them Kent-Turks or Town-Turks, and is inclined to claim them as being of pure Turkish stock, unmixed with Iranian blood or influence. This insistence is odd and hard to reconcile with the fact of the long-established Persian influence in Transoxiana. Moreover, he himself is constrained to attribute the fanatical attitudes of the town-bred *ulema* to Persian influences, and to note their physical resemblance — strong growth of beard and so on — to the Persian and Afghan people farther south. He observes that the new Russian ethnical division of his Türkili has caused the settled Turks to call themselves Uzbeks, and here perhaps is the key to his case.

> Possibly it is they [he writes] who cling most passionately to the name. They who once regarded the Uzbeks as barbarians, now take an interest in the literature of the Uzbek tribe which is replacing the too subtle legends of Persia. It may be that the language of the real Uzbeks will impress itself on the Iranized Kent dialect,[3] and the genuinely Uzbek qualities come to life again.

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 442. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 48 *et seq.*

[3] Long association with Persian has caused the Uzbek spoken in Bukhara and Samarkand to lose the vowel harmonies, and debased the gerund and participial constructions characteristic of all genuine Turkic languages.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kipchak
Uzbek
Nogai



The Kent-Turks may even grasp that they are one nation with other Turks. . . . Seen from this point of view the extended use of the name Uzbek may be a stepping stone to the use of the name Turk to describe the national unity of Turkistan.

The Turkmen with his Oghuz ancestry I have already noted. He is rather to be grouped with the Western Turks. As for the Eastern Turks, I have put forward the tribal name Kipchak as typical of the Turkish stock of the steppe, upon which the Mongol deluge descended. After the Mongol conquest Kipchak disappears as the name of an *ulus*[1] from the pages of the Muslim chronicles. But the Kipchaks, with others like them, supplied the fundamental Turkish element which, overlaid by the Mongol invasion and having joined the Mongols in the wanderings of the Golden Horde, produced in time a mingled Turco-Mongol agglomeration of tribes. From this rough fashioning the Uzbek and the Nogai — also known as the Mangit — issued as pre-eminent. The process worked itself out over the whole range of country from Maveraunnahr, over the Urals, and down to the Volga and the Don, and it is on this ground some of the emigration claim that the cause of the Kazan Tatars of the Volga, and of the Bashkurds[2] in the Urals is one with that of the peoples who were later to be known as the Uzbeks and the Kazaks in Turkistan.

It is interesting, and typical of the Mongol-Turk confusion, that the Uzbek and the Nogai, Turkish tribes, took their name from eponymous Mongol princes of the house of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son and father of the Golden Horde. The imaginative have given the name Uzbek an alternative derivation from the words *öz*, essence, spirit, self, and *beg*, a master — one who is captain of his soul. To each his choice, but Uzbek Khan (1312–40) was an historical prince of the line of Juchi. The picture emerging, which in the main conforms

[1] A Mongol or Turkish nation or tribe. The Pathans too use the word.

[2] The ethnologists set the Bashkurds in the Finno-Ugrian group. But the Bashkurd language belongs to the Turkic, not the Finno-Ugrian, branch of the Altaic system, and their country lay across the way of the Turco-Mongol migrations of the Golden Horde.

R. Caroe 8-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL 1

Uzbek
Nogai
Kazak



101 with Barthold's views, in that it was these Uzbek and Nogai clans, and others of their kind, who became the forerunners of the true (*khugh*) Uzbeks, of the Tatars of Idel-Ural, and of the Kazaks alike. Those of them that became masters of the oases in succession to the Mongol and Timurid houses naturally assimilated some degree of the Persianized manner and habit of mind, body and speech prevailing among the sedentary population, until in the end the Turkic-speaking Sarts
181 claimed enlistment under the Uzbek banner. But, as the Basmachi troubles showed as late as 1920, there were many Uzbeks left in the villages and hill-country who retained all their ancient prowess as warriors up to the time of the coming of the Soviets to Turkistan.

Of the Uzbeks proper Togan writes :[1]

> They do not display that Muslim fanaticism and pride in an effete civilisation which is almost a disease among the Kent-Turks. Although today the Uzbeks live a settled life, their tribal divisions have not entirely lost their political and social importance. They are serious, peaceable and honest, but in war they are as courageous and pitiless as ever they were. They love hard exercise and games on horseback called Kökbori. They have retained their aptitude for war, as they shewed in the Basmachi rebellion, and it is surely they who will one day play the chief part in the political life of Turkistan.

101 Those who remained on the steppe took to themselves in time the generic name of Kazak. As stated, the word Kazak means a vagabond or outlaw — one beyond the pale; it is not a tribal name. The process is not unlike that whereby the branches of the great Ghilzai clans, which cross the North-West Frontier in annual migration from homes in the Afghan highlands to the softer climate of the Indus Valley, are known not by the tribal name of Ghilzais but as Powindahs or graziers. Just as the word *Sart* was used to designate a cultivator or townsman, so Kazak was applied without tribal significance to the nomads of the steppe. In such a country with such a history the ancestry of the Kazaks has been tangled

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 46-7.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kazak



beyond unravelling by a Western hand, but their physique suggests that they retain a larger infusion of Mongol,[1] or, more particularly, Kalmuck, blood than the clans which entered the oases. There is, moreover, a wide distinction between the languages of the steppe and those of the settled regions. Attempts are now being made to study how far a common lingua franca could be developed, based perhaps on the old Chaghatai, but Soviet pressure bears hardly on such efforts and it remains to be seen how far in practice a reconciliation of language can be achieved or would be welcomed by the people themselves.

The Kazaks fought under famous Khans in their struggle against Russian domination, but these Khans were only leaders in the steppe; they never ruled in Turkistan as did the Uzbeks. In their own country they were like the Oghuz, who came from the same stock: '*Ce furent précisément ces tribus qui ne réussirent jamais à s'unifier pour former une unité politique, qui fondèrent les empires turcs les plus puissants*'.[2] But these empires were beyond Central Asia: those who remained and came to be called Kazaks had but a loose tribal organization. Togan writes of them:[3]

> The Russians used to try to persuade themselves that the Kazaks had never really embraced Islam, and it was thought that for this reason anti-God propaganda would succeed among them. The hope has not been realized.

and again of the good and bad features of their tradition:

> A cool head and dislike of haste or excitement, moderation, courage, delight in command, ruthlessness in battle but respect for conditions of a truce, sparing but selling prisoners — a simple mind but not so simple as to be exploited by the foe — encouragement of the blood-feud between individuals, families and even tribes — and the custom of selling children in times of stress.

Schuyler,[4] writing in 1876, has a pleasing picture of an Uzbek of the old régime, Jüre Beg, once Governor of the

[1] For a succinct definition of Mongol tribal subdivisions, ancient and modern, see Howorth (Bib. I, 44), i, 557. Today the main groups are *Khalkha*, *Oirat*, *Buriat* and *Kalmuck*.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 81.

[3] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 534.

[4] *Op. cit.* i, 85.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1
Kalmyk



biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India, and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



Alma Ata, of the Kirghiz Frunze (Pishpek), of the Uzbeks Tashkent, of the Tajiks Stalinabad (Dushambe), of the Turkmens Ashkabad. All these five are on the extreme edge of each territory, the first four of them remarkably close to one another in relation to the great area of the country as a whole. Road communications, though not rail, from Tashkent to Alma Ata go through Frunze. The position of Alma Ata on the edge of the huge Kazak republic is particularly strange, and not altogether explicable by the fact that here are grown the largest apples in the world. It is hard to interpret this tendency, unless the location of the capitals has been fixed with a view to grouping all of them close to Tashkent as the local focus of the central authority. The fifth, Ashkabad, presides over a republic in its origins and history even in recent times turning more towards Azerbaijan and the Caucasus than to Central Asia, and it may be that it looks to Baku as its Capua rather than toward Tashkent.

○○○ I do not suggest that there are no grounds for drawing linguistic boundaries in Turkistan; indeed its whole history shows at least four main historical groupings, the Kazaks of the steppe, the Turkmens along the Persian frontier, the Uzbeks of Transoxiana, Farghana and Khorezm, and the Tajik remnant of the original Iranian population. Moreover, as Barthold observes, both Bukhara and Khorezm had a history of a long viability, while the Kirghiz are in many ways distinct from both the Kazak and the Uzbek tradition. But, in spite of the differences, there was also some real underlying pattern — a unity of spirit and tradition — or it would have been impossible for men like Togan, or Khan Junaid of Khiva, to have ridden the whole land from end to end and won support. Togan makes the point that the Russian object was first, under a cloak of separate race-consciousness, to break down and weaken the natural ties joining the limbs of Turkistan, and then to bring each severed part not into relation with the other parts but into subjection to the outside force, Russia. To serve that end division and subdivision was carried to absurdities. A minority nationalism becomes ridiculous if it

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

# XII

# INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PUBLIC WORKS

*I shall follow the arduous trail blazed by the surveyors, who are charting the course of irrigation systems, by the botanists and forestry experts, who are determining the future flora of the desert, and by the zoologists and ornithologists, who are to populate the new forests and gardens with beasts and birds. I shall meet the soil scientists and agronomists engaged in selecting the crops to be grown on the fields and plantations that will alter the face of the desert. My path will be the path of the archaeologists, who are doing their share to help the canal builders by unearthing the secrets of ancient cultures buried for centuries in the sands. . . .*

BORIS KRINITSKY, on Turkmenian Canal [1]

THE main objective of the two first Five-Year Plans was to create a centre of heavy and light industry in the Urals [2] and beyond, which should be out of reach of any invader, whether Germans coming from the west or Japanese from the east. At an immense cost in human lives and suffering, through scenes of welter and confusion, often sadly lagging but always driven on by a grim determination from above, the great programme staggered through fantastic difficulties during construction until it reached the serious production stage, round about 1935. It was an immense mechanical achievement, and there can be no doubt that it is mainly to Stalin's foresight in building this stronghold that Russia in 1941–2 owed her capacity to stand fast against the German onslaught long enough to receive that unacknowledged margin of assistance from the West which enabled her to survive.

[1] Bib. II, 5. Anthropologists escape notice.

[2] The Urals themselves are just outside Kazakistan, and coincident in the main with Bashkiria, in which is situated Ishimbay. Magnitogorsk is in a narrow strip of RSFSR territory between Kazakistan and Bashkiria. In the industrial picture all this region must be viewed as part of the Central Asian complex.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1



of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

# Turkestan

101 131 The neighbouring countries of Eastern and Western Turkestan, situated in the heart of Central Asia and separated from each other by the Tien Shan mountains, have little more in common than the name, which points to the fact that the country is peopled by Turkish tribes. Because of its extreme barrenness, which makes permanent settlement exceedingly difficult, and its commercially favourable situation between the vast territory of China and the ancient civilizations of Western Asia, Eastern Turkestan is essentially a transit country. In striking contrast to this desert land stands Western Turkestan, which has seen so many influxes of wandering tribes, so many invasions and different settlers, that it is in every respect one of the most interesting countries in the world.

161 The great differences existing between the two countries is best shown by the differences in the density of the population, which depends on the number of people which a country can feed. Western Turkestan (Russian Turkestan) has an extent of about 770,000 square miles, and is inhabited by about 9 million people. Thus the average population per square mile amounts [137] to only 11.5, a fact which shows that large tracts of the country are uninhabitable deserts, and that on the whole it is sparsely populated. Compared with Eastern Turkestan, where only $1^1/_8$ million people inhabit 386,000 square miles, it is, however, a veritable paradise. Eastern Turkestan is one of the most thinly populated countries in the world.

492
484

*A cotton transport in the streets of Samarkand. To this day caravan traffic plays an important part in Turkestan.*

101
133

pulated countries in the world. It is also known as Chinese Turkestan, and today forms part of the province of Sinkiang. The greater part of the country is a barren wilderness (see ill. page 1435). The central part, called the Takla Makan desert, is not only uninhabitable, but practically impassable. The very small quantities of water which run down into this basin at the time of the melting of the snows form the river Tarim, which runs eastward into the salty lake of Lopnor. The few oases, of which Kashgar, Jarkend, and Khotan are the most important, are all situated on the margin of this territory, along which the roads run. All commerce goes by way of caravans which require months to cover the distance from China to Kashgar.

492
133
484

1 [Eastern Turkestan -- Analyst]

2 [See cat 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

4:Leix U-5 (no date)1941 Rl.1 Turkestan Rl.1



*Anau in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now a ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.*

/33 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

● /01 /31 [63] By comparison with this desert area Western Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

# MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

*Richard Pipes*

## Part I

177 THE CRUCIAL QUESTION in the entire future of Soviet Central Asia is the degree to which the native population of that region is succumbing to the process of Russification, actively fostered by the Soviet regime.[1] If the Central Asian natives are gradually losing their ethnic peculiarities and assimilating, either by being absorbed into the Great Russian population or by dissolving in a new, "Soviet" nationality, then Soviet Central Asia may be expected in time fully to merge with the Russian core of the USSR. If, on the other hand, they are resisting alien pressures and retaining their ethnic and cultural complexion, then Central Asia will continue to be set apart from the remainder of Soviet territories, and to merit distinct political treatment. In either event, the fate of Central Asia as a Russian frontier and a potential buffer zone between Russia and China may be said to hinge primarily on the cultural tendencies of its Muslim population.

124 In view of the great shortage of reliable, objective printed materials dealing with the inhabitants of contemporary Soviet Central Asia, an inquiry of this nature must of necessity have recourse to some unorthodox sources of information, among them the testimony of refugees from this area. It must also be confined to the broadest aspects of the question. Neither limitation is quite satisfactory from the point of view of scholarship, but since scholarship is a means for the discovery of truth and not an end in itself, it must be capable of adapting itself to the circumstances.

• 101 [1] By Soviet Central Asia are meant here both the steppe regions and Turkestan, i.e., the territory covered today by the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Prior to the Revolution they embraced the General Gubernie of the Steppe and of Turkestan, the Gubernie of Uralsk and Turgai, and the dependent principalities of Khiva and Bukhara. By the term "Russians" is meant not only the Great Russians, but also the Ukrainians and Belorussians, because statistical and other information for Central Asia rarely distinguishes among these Slavic subgroups.

114 ◆ RICHARD PIPES is Research Associate of the Harvard Russian Research Center and Tutor in History and Literature, Harvard University. He is the author of *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), a history of the nationalist movements in the Russian borderlands during and immediately after the Russian Revolution.

A summary of this article has been published for limited circulation by the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The present complete text is here presented with the Center's full permission.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1



127 The primary sources of information for this essay consisted of the standard literature on Central Asia, pre-Revolutionary and Soviet, and of materials collected in the course of interviews conducted with 31 Muslim refugees from the Soviet Union, most of them from Central Asia.[1] These interviews concentrated on the personal experiences of the informants, and avoided, insofar as possible, references to politics, in order to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of deliberate concealment or lying. All the informants were male, and consisted, in their majority, of persons 30 to 50 years of age, with a high school or *tekhnikum* education, who had left the Soviet Union as laborers or prisoners of war in the course of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. They represented, in other words, largely the middle-aged Soviet "intelligentsia" (in the Communist sense of the word). The conclusions derived from the interviews were placed against the historical background of Central Asia for the purpose of separating the accidental from the essential, on the assumption that generalizations obtained from interviews were both more reliable and more significant in terms of the future when in agreement with pre-Soviet developments in Central Asia. The fact that in the main there is such agreement seems to the author an added reason for confidence in the correctness of the conclusions thus derived.

121 The main criteria used in investigating the cultural tendencies of Central Asian Muslim were five: religion, customs, language, ethnic identity, and the character and trends of the native intelligentsia. An attempt was made in each case to determine the extent and nature of the changes which had occurred under Soviet rule; to ascertain whether these changes agreed with or ran contrary to the spontaneous developments taking place prior to the 1917 Revolution; and finally, to evaluate their meaning in terms of the probable future.

## *RELIGION*

000 The term "religion" comprises at least three distinct phenomena: a belief in the existence of one or more supreme beings; a set of rituals which gives this belief external expression; and a way of life based upon the principles explicitly and implicitly enunciated by the belief's founders. In analyzing the religious life of a community, these aspects must be clearly differentiated.

• 101 Russian Central Asia consists of two main parts, distinguished from each other by historic tradition, culture, and topography: the northern half, the steppe region (today's Kazakhstan), and the southern half, Turkestan (comprising the remaining four Central Asian republics). The

122 [1] These interviews were conducted in the summer of 1953 under the auspices and with the generous assistance of the Institute of Intercultural Studies and the Ford Foundation. I wish to express my particular gratitude to Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, who first suggested this task and was instrumental in enabling me to carry it out. I also would like to thank the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for its kind help in completing this inquiry.

5; Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 . RLl Turkestan RLl



The population of the former[1] was traditionally nomadic, Turkish, and in religious matters fairly indifferent. Turkestan, on the other hand, being predominantly urban and agricultural, and inhabited by Iranians and considerably Arabicized and Iranicized Turks, was until the Soviet period one of the great centers of Islamic learning and practice. This difference between the religious background of the two regions must be kept in mind when studying contemporary Central Asian Muslims.

The most striking feature of the religious attitude of the Muslim refugees is their strong and articulate hostility toward all forms of established religion, including Islam. Time and again, the informants expressed the conviction that all religion is a form of superstition incapable of standing the test of "science," of serving society as a means of attaining social progress. The typical opinion ran as follows: "Yes, I believe in a Supreme Being, but it doesn't matter whether He is called Allah, God, Christ, or anything else. Nor does He care whether I pray or not. Religion is a superstition which keeps people backward. Look at the Arabs and Persians, where religion has gotten them: they are poor and ignorant. To achieve progress, we must not allow religion to interfere, though religion should not be persecuted because it does help some people in facing life." The general assumptions behind such reasoning are fairly obvious: the belief in a conflict between faith and reason, religion and science; a pragmatic, utilitarian scale of values; scepticism of certain aspects of religion, leading to a wholesale rejection of all religion.

In the long run, this attitude may well determine the whole future of Islam in Central Asia. The intelligentsia displays the same cult of reason, and of its concomitant, secular society, in an extreme, uncomprising way, as do the educated groups of other Asian societies. Here, as there, progress, the ultimate good, is conceived as incompatible with religion. Against such hostility to established religion the revival of Islam in its pre-1917 form, even under conditions of complete freedom, does not seem likely.

This conclusion is strengthened by the picture given of the religious practices of Central Asian Muslims. Islam in the Soviet Union has to operate under extremely difficult conditions, due in part to the specific repressive measures undertaken by the regime against religion, and in part to the general conditions of Soviet life. In the first category are the physical destruction of the Islamic leadership undertaken between 1927 and 1932 through the arrest and deportation of virtually all persons enjoying some religious status in the Muslim community, from the top hierarchy to the lowest village mullah; the closing of nearly all the village mosques and most of the city mosques; the threat of dismissal hanging constantly over every Soviet citizen in any position of responsibility if known to engage in religious practices; and the nearly complete suppression of all religious literature through the change of the native alphabets (from Arabic to

[1] [the northern half of Soviet Central Asia or Kazakhstan -- Analyst]

162/327/1) The Russian population, not counting those in military service, constitutes about 1% of the entire population of the region. It is concentrated primarily in the Semirechie oblast' (44,089 persons, male and female), being mostly village people (Cossacks and peasants), with a small number of residents in the towns of the oblast'. Taken with the non-Russian population the Russian element constitutes over 7% here.

In the Syr-Darya oblast' the Russian population totals 8,447 persons (0.8% of the total population), and is concentrated primarily in the towns of Tashkent (up to 5,000 persons) and Kazalinsk (ca.1500), with a very limited number in other urban settlements of the oblast.

The Russian inhabitants in the towns of the Zeravshan okrug number about 4,000 (about 1% of the population of the okrug). In the Amu-Darya otdel the Russian element consists of 1,184 persons (1%) of whom the majority are Ural Cossack emigrants.

In the Fergana oblast' in 1876 there were 1,229 Russians.

●101 162 2) The Tatars have migrated into this region at various time and have figured as traders, exploiting the nomads. Staying in the towns only temporarily, the Tatars have evaded the census, for which reason there must actually be more of them than is shown in the table.

3) The Sarts constitute about 22% of

RLI

101
102

the total population of the region and up to 44% of all the sedentary natives. They spring from a mixture of various peoples and represent themselves as sedentary nomads, occupied in agriculture and trade. The Sarts constitute the nucleus of the native town and village population in the southern uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast and in all the Fergana oblast, and also in the Zeravshan okrug. In the Semirechie oblast there are no solid Sart settlements as yet. Here the Sarts live in small numbers, dispersed among the towns, are newcomers and are occupied in trade. The Sarts will be described in greater detail below.

4) The Kazakhs, and the Kirgiz, who are related to them, constitute numerically the predominant element in the population of the region, 48%. Nevertheless their distribution among the various oblast is by no means equal. /328/ Thus in the Semirechie oblast they are over 78% of the population, in the Syr-Darya oblast, 62%, in the Amu-Darya otdel they are only 29%, in the Fergana oblast not over 17%, and in the Zeravshan okrug barely o. 2%.

The primary occupation of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz is cattle raising. Yet a part of these people, these who are poor and do not own cattle, work of necessity in cotton cultivation, or in sowing millet and barley. These poor nomads are called 'iginchi', and they make up the sedentary element of the Kazakh population. In the Syr-Darya oblast, of 124, 325 tents over 50, 000 households belong to such Kazakhs, who are agriculturalists. The total number of iginchi in the okrug comes to about 300, 000 persons, male and female. (1)

1. The Cholo-Kazakhs are counted as

1[See category 116, pp 46-70 - analyst]

162
101 Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the development [181] of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

162
563 7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

RL1

162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have lost both their political and their tribal
162 significance for the most part. A considerable
101 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have turned into a special family, so to speak, which is known in Central Asia by the name of the Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40% of the total population. On the right bank of the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks constitute about 3% of the population and in the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life, and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans, lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./ Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes, a list of which was appended by him to his well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva (A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes. Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that the classification of Uzbek clans can probably never be explained since the two essential sources for this can never be thoroughly reconciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge (Geographical and statistical information on the Zeravshan okrug) Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

618 geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki ( Notes of the imperial Russian Geographical Society in the division of statistics) IV St. Petersburg, 1874, p. 138

For the Uzbeks are subdivided differently in actual life than they are according to the books which are almost never read by the population, [101] not even by the scholars. Many small tribes call themselves by the name of their location, and when they move they change their name. Some of the more powerful clans, such as the Mangit, Ming, Kipchaks, Naimans, Yuz, Keneges, and others, are spread over a considerable area and keep their names in a more stable fashion. But on the other hand their divisions and subdivisions often adopt special names and are raised to the rank of new clans.

162 [101] 8) The Karakalpaks constitute 2% of the total population of the area. The majority of them live in the Amu-Darya otdel, where they number 51,710 /330/ constituting about half of the total population. In addition 7,060 Karakalpaks live in the Fergana oblast. Karakalpaks, mixed with Sarts and Kurama, also live in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Kurana uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast. Until the middle of the last century the Karakalpaks lived along the lower Syr river, but when they were forced out by the Dzungarians they moved to their present locations. The ravages they suffered were so great that they were never able to recover until they came under the in- [181] fluence of the Russians. This people is outstanding for its industry and peaceful inclinations. It is occupied in agriculture and to some extent in livestock raising. On the Amu-

162 On the Amu-
[118] Darya the Karakalpaks make up an extensive
[123] ommunity composed of twelve separate clans. They use the land jointly according to common right.

162 9) The Turkmen live exclusively in the Amu-
101 Darya otdel, where they constitute up to 5% of the total population. They lead a semi-nomadic form of life using land which was irrigated earlier by the Karakalpaks for agricultural purposes. Under the rule of Khiva in place of obligations they bore the militia or 'nuker' service in time of war. Now they have been put on a level with the other groups of the sedentary population of Amu-Darya in regard to obligations, and must themselves maintain the irrigation required for their needs.

101 10) The Taranchi are Sarts who live in the permanent settlements in the Kuldja region. The name Taranchi was given them by the Chinese, meaning "worker." Their ancestors were settled in the Ili valley from eastern Turkestan by the Chinese government in the middle of the last century, just after the conquest of Dzungaria. This resettlement was undertaken as a form of punishment for these people for their participation in the revolt of 1756, and also as a colonization of the Ili valley, which was ruined and depopulated at that time.
[162] There are 51,891 Taranchi, male and female, in the Kuldja region, which is about 40% of the local population. Their form of life is the same as that of the Sarts in general. After the rout of the Chinese by the Dungans in 1865, the Taranchi gradually took the hegemony of the Ili valley into their hands. They routed the Dungans (under Bayandai) and formed an independent state under the rule of their Sultan Abil Oglia in 1867. The proud and /331/ arrogant tone adopted by Abil' Oglia and his protection of robbers who found refuge in his lands, led the Russian government to dethrone

him in 1871 and annex his dominions to the Empire.

11) The Dungans. They are reckoned at about 20,000 persons in the okrug. In the Kuldja region before the last emigration of the Dungans from Kashgaria after its conquest by the Chinese, they totalled 4,030 persons. They lived then and live now in the towns of Suidun, /Sui-ting/ Chinchakhodzi /Ch'ing-shui-ho-tzu/ and Tardzhi /Hui-yuan?/. The Dungans who migrated settled in the Fergana and Semirechie oblast'v. The largest settlement of the Dungan emigrants is in the Tokmak uyezd, 7 versts north of Tokmak in the Karakunus valley, where about 4,000 of them now live. They came in 1878 and as a result of their industry have built up and established excellent farming land.

The origin of the Dungans is unclear. According to their own tradition their ancestors, who were moslems, conquered China by force of arms but gradually submitted to the conquered people, adopting their language, customs and costume. Although the Dungans also mixed considerably with the Chinese through intermarriage they still retained their tribal individualism and, most important, their religion. Their hatred for the Chinese is without limit.

The Dungans are of medium height and are notably corpulent. They have a high protuberant forehead; their brows are thick and arched; the eyes are slightly raised in the corners; the cheekbones protrude very insignificantly; the face is oval; the mouth is of

141 medium size; the lips are thick, the teeth
142 medium; the chin is round, the ears are small and flattened; the hair is black and smooth; the beard is sparse and tough. The skin is smooth, the neck powerful and the extremities medium.

197 They[1] speak Chinese and wear Chinese
302 costume but nevertheless they shave their heads.
463 Their occupations are agriculture, gardening and various crafts. They make no celebration
844 when a child is born. The mother remains in
846 bed for fifteen days. The child receives its
553 name the day after it is born, in the presence of the mullah. The circumcision of boys is
852 performed on the eighth, ninth or tenth day.
583 A girl who is marrying receives a dowry. /332/
764 After death the body is wrapped in a white cloth
765 and buried directly in the ground. After the burial the mullahs and relatives gather for a
587 funeral feast. A widow may remarry after the
593 lapse of ninety days. In family life parental authority is very strong and the father is the
291 absolute head of the family. The women do not cover their faces. These people are outstanding
181 for their high morals, industry and hospitality.

101 12) The Kalmyks, and the Torgouts who
221 are related to them,[2] are nomads. The former nomadize in the Vernoye and Issyk-Kul uyezds of the Semirechie oblast, and the latter in the Kuldja region, around Kunges. Since 1878 the Torgouts have begun to migrate to Yulduz.

162 The 13) Sibo (13;318 persons), the
101 14) Solons ( 4,182 persons), and the 15) Kara-Kiti( 3,032 persons) belong to the Mongol (read Manchu-Tungusic, ed.) peoples. The majority of them (21,932 persons, male and female) live

[1] [The Dungans, see cat 116, p. 11--Analyst]

162 101 in the Kuldja region and are the remnants of military settlers once settled on the Ili river by the Chinese government. RL 1

16) The Tadzhiks constitute about 4.5% of the total population of the area. They are Aryans and are related to the Persians. These are the aborigines of the country, some of whom were forced out by the invasions of the Turko-Mongol peoples into the mountainous places, difficult of access. There are therefore two subdivisions of Tadzhiks: those who live in the valleys, and those in the mountains. These people are very intelligent; although oppressed by the Uzbeks, they have nevertheless had a good influence on their oppressors, with whom they have been mixing up to the present time. Within the okrug the largest number of Tadzhiks are in the Khodzhent uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast, where they constitute over 30% of the total population; then in the Zeravshan region they make up over 19% of the total, in the Kurama uyezd (in the mountains) they are 3% and in the Fergana oblast they are 1.6% of the total population. The mountain Tadzhiks in the Zeravshan okrug are called Galchas.

17) The Persians live in small numbers in the Zeravshan okrug and in the Amu-Darya otdel. They are former slaves who were freed when the Russians conquered this region. A large number of them were sent back to their [795] country at the expense of the state. Being of the Shi'ite religious sect the Persians are in /333/ sharp opposition to all the other Moslem people of Turkestan, who belong to the Sunnite sect.

18) The Hindus are scattered all over the

162 region in commercial industrial centers, where
101 they are moneylenders. Their number is actually much higher than the official figure and they should be counted as at least 3,000 persons. Only Indian men live in Turkestan.

19) The Gypsies, called Liuli by the natives, live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug. Their number is no higher than 1,000 persons, male and female.

20) Jews also live primarily in the Zeravshan okrug where their number is as high asl,974 persons; their total in this area is up to 3,000 persons, male and female. Before the Russian occupation of the region they were terribly oppressed. As in Europe the Jews here are occupied in crafts and in trade.

21) The Arabs are descendants of the conquerors who entered Central Asia in the ninth century. They lead a semi-nomadic life in the environs of Samarkand and Katta-Kurgan. They number 2,000 to 3,000 persons.

162. The Division of the Population by Religious Faith

The religious faith with the largest number of adherents among the population of Turkestan is the Sunnite sect of the Moslems. There is only a small number of Persians who are Shiites. The Christians form the next largest group, followed by the pagans and finally by the Jews.

| | |
|---|---|
| Moslems | 2,900,000 |
| Orthodox Christian | 57,000 |
| Catholics | 2,000 |

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL]

# IX

# SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power.

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful.

## THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the foundations for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the eighteenth century onwards.

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two-pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction.

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political planning]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1



[Uigur]
[Dungan]

## VI. THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Tu 563 S.U 563 The problem of national minorities is of great importance for the Central Asiatic Republics. Each of the five Central Asiatic 'state nations' has minorities in the other four republics. Some of them are numerically fairly large, such as the Uzbeks in Kirghizistan and Tadzhikistan, or the Turkmenians in Uzbekistan.

In addition there are minorities who have their national territories outside Soviet Central Asia, but inside the U.S.S.R., such as Tartars, Mordvinians, Armenians, etc. Finally, there are ethnical groups who have no national republic either in Central Asia or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. These peoples, the bulk of whom live outside the U.S.S.R., are of considerable interest since they occupy a definite, even if subordinate, place in Russia's policy towards her Central-Asiatic neighbours. Into this category fall the Uigurs and Dungans, who live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Another nationality which may eventually become a tool of Soviet foreign policy are the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. There are also Arabs in Uzbekistan, who theoretically could be a formidable weapon in the hands of Soviet diplomacy, but who for practical reasons could not play this part.*

### UIGURS AND DUNGANS

Tu 563 [101] The Uigurs, a Turkic people racially related to the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, and the Dungans, of mixed Arab and Persian origin, who had kept the Moslem faith but adopted the Chinese tongue, are both peoples of Western China. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the two peoples endeavoured to shake off Chinese rule and set up independent Khanates of their own. When these attempts failed, many Dungans and Uigurs fled into Russian territory. A particularly heavy exodus of the Uigurs took place when, in 1881, Russia restored to China the Kuldzha border district which she had occupied during the Western Chinese troubles of 1871.

The Uigurs and Dungans were readily granted Russian citizenship and

* All these minorities already lived in Central Asia under the Czarist régime. The Soviet Government added to them some other ethnical groups who had not been previously associated with Central Asia. Their members came to the Central Asiatic Republics as inmates of forced labour camps, as evacuees during the war, and also as more or less voluntary settlers. A particularly interesting community formed by the latter is a Korean minority which has been living in the Kzyl Orda Province of Kazakhstan since 1928. The Koreans of Kazakhstan are very successful rice-growers and their collective farms, bearing such names as 'Bolshevik', 'Third International' and 'Gigant', have acquired a certain fame.** Other Korean groups have settled more recently and perhaps less voluntarily in the Khorezm Province and in the Tashkent Province of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Koreans are mostly cotton planters. Politically the Central Asiatic Koreans are without influence, except for one Korean deputy in the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.